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Abstract
Constitutions traffic in magic and deceit, argues Günter Frankenberg, promising freedom
and democracy even as they underwrite the exercise of coercive power on a massive scale.
Scholars should approach constitutions with a healthy skepticism, but, Frankenberg
contends, most mainstream scholars are too credulous, especially regarding the claims of
liberal constitutionalism. Comparative Constitutional Studies serves as his corrective to the
perceived blind spots and predilections of mainstream comparative constitutional
scholarship, and it gives attention to little-known constitutions, forgotten histories, and
alternatives to liberal constitutionalism. It’s a rich, challenging, and valuable book, one that
takes the reader to some off-the-beaten-track places and offers some new perspectives on
well-studied landmarks. It does not, however, represent such a radical break from
mainstream scholarship as the author supposes, both because the book’s own analysis, in
practice, is not deeply unconventional, and because mainstream scholarship is more diverse
than Frankenberg gives it credit for.
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The subtitle of Günter Frankenberg’s recent book Comparative Constitutional Studies1 is
Between Magic and Deceit—and between its covers, Frankenberg practices a deceit of his
own. He identifies the book as a “textbook,” but don’t believe it: this text is too original,
personal, subversive, intellectually demanding, and witty to qualify. Textbooks teach their
readers the standard methods and key findings in a field of study. Frankenberg’s book, by
contrast, undertakes a frontal assault on central aspects of what he regards as “the
mainstream” in comparative constitutional law. At every turn, the book challenges those
scholars who work in the field to do better: To question our unstated normative
assumptions, our selection of cases, and our methods.
The book is animated by a doubled skepticism: Scholars have to be wary of constitutions,
and also of the dominant comparative constitutional discourse. In other words, we must
always stay awake to the possibility that constitutions may be lying to us—and that scholars
may be lying to themselves, without knowing it. Vigilance is required, first of all, because
constitutions promise magic—a “more perfect union”; 2 to “Heal the divisions of the past and
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights”;3 “to secure to all its citizens JUSTICE . . . , LIBERTY . . . , EQUALITY . . . , [and]
FRATERNITY”4—while at the same time licensing, and perhaps disguising, the exercise of
coercive power on a massive scale. Frankenberg argues that the dominant discourse in
comparative constitutional scholarship is also suspect. The mainstream view, according to
Frankenberg, supposes an underlying unity to constitutional enterprises playing out around
world:
[C]omparativists downplay differences, proceed with an eye towards
convergence or rapproachement, claim that there is a significant degree
of congruence between social problems and their constitutional solutions,
and argue that the areas of agreement and overlap clearly outweigh
significant contextual, structural or functional diversity. This unitary vision
is criticized as being intensely Anglo-Eurocentric, thereby sustaining the
conceptual dominance and ideological hegemony of Western
constitutionalism.5
For Frankenberg, this orientation is no accident, but the reflection of methodological,
theoretical, and ideological commitments—commitments that are often only implicit, and,
1

FRANKENBERG ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES: BETWEEN MAGIC AND DECEIT (Edward Elgar ed., 2018).
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in Frankenberg’s view, that should be subjected to careful interrogation. Chief among these
commitments are an unreflective functionalism—in which constitutions figure as solutions
to problems, but problems as conceptualized by the outside analyst rather than participants
in the system—and an operating assumption that liberal constitutionalism is “real”
constitutionalism, with the result that constitutional analysis becomes measuring degrees
of divergence from this ideal.
What, then, is the way forward? Part of Frankenberg’s answer is attitude: One defense
against deception is cultivating a habit of skepticism, an eternal vigilance against falling into
conventional wisdom. More concretely, he aims here “to look at as many constitutions as
possible, notably at other-constitutions”—those neglected or treated as marginal by most
scholars, such as Haiti’s short-lived 1801 and 1805 constitutions.6 Also, recognizing that
constitutions do—and are—many things at the same time, he prescribes a “layered
narrative” that combines different reading strategies. Constitutions need to be read as
literary texts and subjected to a penetrating, even deconstructive, reading. At the same time,
constitutions should be read as constructive plans: designs for institutions and power
structures. What is more, constitutions must be read as products of transfer and bricolage:
These are texts that talk to each other.
Besides describing his methods, in Part I Frankenberg also inventories the concepts he uses
in comparative constitutional work, and here too, he stresses less familiar approaches and
viewpoints. To be sure, the standard-issue contemporary constitution, fixated on the design
challenge of building a democratic, law-governed, free, and stable polity—the “codified
constitution,” in his terms—figures among his constitutional archetypes. But he gives equal
airtime to: The “constitution as manifesto,” with a distinctive rhetoric and agenda; the
“constitution as contract,” negotiated among elite interest groups; and the “constitution as
programme/plan,” pioneered by communist regimes. Even in cataloging the basic building
blocks of constitutional architecture, Frankenberg challenges conventional wisdom,
downplaying, for instance, the importance of rights. Notwithstanding their centrality to
contemporary scholarly discourse, Frankenberg argues, constitutional rights often mean
little for the truly vulnerable. Frankenberg focuses attention instead on constitutional values
and constitutional duties. Constitutional values, in particular, have legs, in that values talk is
a way of spreading responsibility for constitutional culture beyond the state and into society.
Similarly, in enumerating the varieties of constitutionalism, Frankenberg treats liberal
constitutionalism less as the apotheosis of the genus, and more as one of many
constitutionalisms incapable of fully delivering what it promises. Front and center in
Frankenberg’s treatment is liberal constitutionalism’s particular admixture of magic and
deceit. The emphasis in liberal constitutional discourse on rights, the separation of powers,
and the primacy of “we the people” oversells the constitution’s capacity to restrain the state
6
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power that it underwrites. In Frankenberg’s view, “in critical situations, the Leviathan is back,
if dressed in a cashmere overcoat.”7 Moreover, the unwavering focus on the state serves as
a form of misdirection, drawing attention away from the accumulation and exercise of
private power.
The most prominent competitor to liberal constitutionalism today is political
constitutionalism, which trusts legislatures rather than courts to keep constitutional
commitments. But political constitutionalism also promises more than it can deliver,
overstating the role of “the people” in parliamentary sovereignty regimes. And alongside
these, Frankenberg presents a rich variety of other constitutionalisms: Egalitarian
constitutionalism (focused on leveling up along one or more dimensions); conservative
constitutionalism (embedding a suspicion of uncabined democracy); social constitutionalism
(setting the powers of state to addressing the social question), transformative
constitutionalism (aimed at a progressive realization of an emancipatory modernization
project), and marxist-leninist constitutionalism (a variant of transformative
constitutionalism).
The second part of the book, on constitutional transfer and experimentalism, underscores
that constitution-making is, and has always been, a transnational process. Frankenberg
cheekily imagines the market for constitutional ideas as an IKEA, where customers can
choose among a vast array of existing provisions (some assembly required). At the heart of
this part of the book is a case study that traces conceptions of constitutional monarchy as
they passed through a succession of nineteenth-century European states, changing with
each stop. The account aptly illustrates the twin truths about “the migration of
constitutional ideas”:8 That nothing is wholly original, and that everything becomes new in
a new setting.
The third and final part of the book addresses the idea of “constitution as order.” The focus
here is on the work—sometimes dirty work—that constitutions do to keep society together.
There are a number of aspects to this: Constitutions promote social integration (to different
degrees, depending on the form of constitutionalism at issue); they manage high-stakes
political conflict, including through strategies for converting “do-or-die” conflicts into
“more-or-less” conflicts; and they define the borders of political community, which
necessarily means placing some outside of it. Frankenberg also engages with the challenge
of designing constitutions for states facing a risk of partition or fragmentation. Strategies
range from the denial or suppression of difference (as in China’s 1982 Constitution) to
accommodation (as in Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution). Frankenberg also canvasses how
constitutions seek to cabin, control, and define states of exception. For Frankenberg, the
paradigmatic justification for suspending the normal rules is the natural emergency, and
7

Id. at 95.
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governments seek to justify emergency powers by framing man-made crises in similar terms.
Frankenberg assimilates the colony, the slave plantation, and the concentration camp to the
state of exception: All, he argues, are settings where the exception has become the rule for
defined outgroups.
This is a rich, challenging, and valuable book, one that takes the reader to some
off-the-beaten-track places and offers some new perspectives on well-studied landmarks.
Ironically, one of the reasons the book succeeds is that it does not quite deliver what it
promises, namely, a complete rejection of methods and concepts of mainstream
comparative constitutional scholarship. For instance: the book shines in its in-depth
engagement with constitutional texts. But notwithstanding the head feints in the direction
of deconstruction, Frankenberg’s handling of the texts is light on feats of Derridean derringdo and heavy on sensible, careful, but fundamentally conventional readings. There’s
substantial value in this approach, because many of these texts are off the radar, and
Frankenberg’s work brings them a welcome attention.
Similarly, despite the talk of layered narratives, much of the book is given over to the cuttingedge method pioneered by Carl Linnaeus in the eighteenth century: taxonomy. Frankenberg
offers the reader, among other menus, four constitutional archetypes; four elements of
constitutional architecture; six forms of constitutionalism; and three models of
constitutional monarchy. This is no complaint, although one might quibble over whether the
categories that Frankenberg devises are collectively comprehensive and individually distinct.
What gives Frankenberg’s taxonomies their value is the hard empirical work he puts into
exploring the understudied regimes, including those belonging to the past, and his
unwillingness to settle for a set of received categories to slot them into.
Every choice involves trade-offs, including those that Frankenberg makes in his book. Two
of Frankenberg’s key methodological commitments are to consider a large number of
constitutions and to pay close attention to their text. It follows that little attention is left for
what is outside the text. The result is an approach that is expansive in one sense, and limited
in another. The book’s title—Contemporary Constitutional Studies—is apt: The focus here is
squarely on the constitutions themselves, or more precisely, on their texts. This approach
condemns us to miss much, if what we care about is the real work that constitutions do in
society. Frankenberg faults mainstream scholarship for focusing too much on cases. He has
a point—it is easy for scholars to fetishize cases—but at the same time, cases are an
important channel through which constitutions have an effect on the world around them,
and they offer the analyst a way to track how a constitution’s meaning on the ground can
change over time. More generally, Frankenberg’s near-exclusive focus on texts does not
allow him much scope to take account of constitutional development, apart from formal
amendments. It seems almost as though for Frankenberg, as for American textualists, the
constitution is its text.
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Frankenberg’s critique of mainstream comparative constitutional law scholarship has some
bite, but it invites objections of its own. Frankenberg is right, of course, that we should not
look (as Ran Hirschl has put it) to “the constitutional experience of half a dozen (on a good
day) politically stable, economically prosperous, liberal democracies”9 and flatter ourselves
that we have covered the waterfront. At the same time, our selection of cases should be
informed by the questions to which we seek answers. If our question is about the effect of
a particular institutional feature, for instance, a strategy of comparing most similar cases—
to hold as much else constant as possible—can make sense. More generally, constitutions
can lay claim on our attention for different reasons. To the extent we want a comprehensive
picture of the world’s constitutions, all are equally relevant. But if we are seeking viable
models for handling issue x, it makes sense to be more selective. To offer an extreme
example, Frankenberg opens his book with a discussion of Syria’s 2012 constitution, put
together by the Assad regime during the civil war. Frankenberg all but calls it a sham
constitution. It is worth knowing about the phenomenon of sham constitutions,10 but there
are also good reasons why scholars have not subjected the provisions of Syria’s 2012
constitution to minute analysis.
Frankenberg’s critique also has less bite today than it would have had in the past, because
the mainstream in comparative constitutional law is not what it once was. A casual stroll
through any recent volume of I•CON will confirm that comparative constitutional law today
engages deeply with different kinds of constitutions from different regions. The field itself is
also increasingly transnational, with scholars from around the world collaborating and
making important contributions. The empirical turn in comparative constitutional law, about
which Frankenberg has little to say, has done much to broaden the field’s horizons past the
small roster of usual suspect countries to which Hirschl refers. Good empirical work is
valuable, among other reasons, because data can challenge old assumptions about what the
dominant practices are. The empirical work of scholars such as Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg,
David Law, and Mila Versteeg has done much to challenge conventional wisdom about what
is the norm in constitutions worldwide. Also, to the extent that the scholarly discourse ever
presupposed a global convergence towards the liberal constitutional model, the rise of
illiberal regimes around the world in recent years has unsettled that assumption. As
Frankenberg reminds us, liberal constitutionalism is one option among many, and those who
embrace it as an ideal have to make the case for it.
The distance, then, between Frankenberg and other contemporary scholars of comparative
constitutional law may not be so great as he supposes—both because his methods, in
practice, turn out not to be especially radical, and because mainstream scholarship has
already heeded at least some of the precepts he preaches. None of this diminishes the value
of his book, which exposes the reader to understudied regimes, sorts the constitutional
9
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world, past and present, into an original conceptual framework, and, perhaps most
importantly, admonishes us to be always attentive to constitutions’ power to enchant and
deceive.
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